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Analysis
Murder through the Looking Glass:
Gillon v HM Advocate
A. DRURY AND ITS DISCONTENTS
It is probably safe to regard Drury v HM Advocate,1 a Full Bench decision on the 
operation of provocation (particularly in cases of provocation by infi delity), as the most 
controversial judicial decision on Scots criminal law of recent years.2
Although the decision was directly concerned with provocation, the criticism it 
received did not, for the most part, focus on its consequences for that plea.3 Instead, 
it was concerned with the court’s analysis of the offence of murder. According to 
the Lord Justice-General (Rodger), who delivered the leading opinion, provocation 
operates by negating the mens rea of murder. That mens rea was formerly, according 
to the long-accepted “Macdonald” defi nition, either an intention to kill, or “wicked 
recklessness”.4 However, according to Lord Rodger, that defi nition was incomplete: 
“just as the recklessness has to be wicked so also must the intention be wicked”.5 The 
existence of provocation would mean that the accused’s action “though culpable, was 
not wicked”,6 with the consequence that he should be convicted of culpable homicide 
rather than murder.
Regardless of the criteria which might be set out for a plea of provocation, that 
analysis of its operation is controversial for a number of interconnected reasons. First, 
1 2001 SLT 1013.
2 In addition to Sir Gerald Gordon’s commentary on the case at 2001 SCCR 618, the decision has been the 
subject of three critical articles: J Chalmers, “Collapsing the structure of criminal law” 2001 SLT (News) 
241; M G A Christie, “The coherence of Scots criminal law: some aspects of Drury v HM Advocate” 
2002 JR 273; F Leverick, “Mistake in self-defence after Drury” 2001 JR 35. Critical comment can also 
be found in V Tadros, “The structure of defences in Scots criminal law” (2003) 7 EdinLR 60 at 71; V 
Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (2005) 104; P R Ferguson, “Codifying criminal law (1): A critique of 
Scots criminal law” [2004] Crim LR 49 at 52; C H W Gane, C N Stoddart and J Chalmers, A Casebook 
on Scottish Criminal Law, 3rd edn (2001) para 10.21. Oddly, it appears that the only academic defence 
of Drury is be found in a paper on South African law written to assist the (English) Law Commission in 
its review of partial defences to murder: J Burchell, “Paper on provocation, diminished responsibility and 
the use of excessive force in self-defence in South African Law”, in Law Commission, Partial Defences 
to Murder (Consultation Paper No 173, Appendices, 2003) 184 at 208 (available at http://www.lawcom.
gov.uk/docs/cp173apps.pdf).
3 The critical response has, however, been invoked in support of a proposed review of the law of provoca-
tion: Scottish Law Commission, Seventh Programme of Law Reform (Scot Law Com No 198 (2005)) 
para 2.48.
4 J H A Macdonald, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law of Scotland, 5th edn, by J Walker and D J 
Stevenson (1948) 89.
5 2001 SLT 1013 at para 11.
6 At para 18.
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it is based on a fallacious assumption: that is, that the defi nition of a criminal offence 
should set out conclusive conditions of liability. That is simply not how offences and 
defences operate in Scots law. Instead, an offence defi nition sets out suffi cient condi-
tions of liability, but it is open to the accused to plead a valid defence to avoid convic-
tion. For that reason, defences – that is, defences “proper” – may be differentiated 
from simple denials of actus reus or mens rea, as in Jamieson v HM Advocate, where 
the Lord Justice-General (Hope) distinguished between a denial of mens rea and a 
“substantive defence”.7
That separation of offence and defence was reaffi rmed by the appeal court shortly 
after Drury when, in Lord Advocate’s Reference (No 1 of 2000),8 it was made clear that 
defences such as necessity did not negate any “malice” in the mens rea of malicious 
mischief. Instead, the actus reus and mens rea of that offence would be established if 
it were shown that there had been “intentional or reckless destruction of the property 
of another … in the knowledge that the destructive conduct complained of was carried 
out with complete disregard for, or indifference to, the property or possessory rights 
of another”.9 A successful plea of necessity might nevertheless result in an acquittal, 
but without any question of mens rea being negated.10
All this, of course, might be regarded as rather harmless wordplay, with its worst 
consequence being potential confusion – why, for example, might provocation negate 
“wickedness” in “wicked intent”, but not “evilness” in “evil intent” (the mens rea of 
assault)?11 Its potential consequences, however, are rather more serious than that, and 
two main objections were raised to the Drury analysis.
First, if, as Lord Rodger suggests, defences operate because they evidence a lack of 
mens rea, then that threatens to render defences entirely subjective, and strip them of 
any objective content. It has been a long-standing rule in Scots law that while defences 
such as self-defence may be founded on a mistake of fact, that mistake must be based 
on reasonable grounds.12 Logically, however, the Drury analysis leaves no room for 
this requirement of reasonableness, because the accused’s motive will be the same 
regardless of the reasonableness of his belief.13 It might, of course, be argued that the 
requirement of reasonable grounds is unnecessary or inappropriate,14 but it would be 
highly undesirable for such a signifi cant change in the law – which may even be incom-
patible with the ECHR15 – to be brought about in this inadvertent fashion.
7 1994 JC 88 at 92.
8 2001 JC 143.
9 At para 30 per Lord Prosser, giving the opinion of the court.
10 An analysis that has also been accepted by the House of Lords in DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] 
AC 653 at 679-680 per Lord Wilberforce, and by the Canadian Supreme Court: see R v Parent [2001] 1 
SCR 761 at para 6; R v Kerr [2004] 2 SCR 371 at para 28 per Bastarache J, para 93 per LeBel J.
11 See Chalmers (n 2) at 243.
12 See J Chalmers and F Leverick, Criminal Defences and Pleas in Bar of Trial (2006) ch 3.
13 See Chalmers (n 2); Leverick (n 2).
14 See R Singer, “The resurgence of mens rea: II – honest but unreasonable mistake of fact in self defense” 
(1986-1987) 28 Boston College Law Review 459 at 512. For the counter-argument, see Leverick (n 2); 
F Leverick, Killing in Self-Defence (2006) ch 9; A P Simester, “Mistakes in defence” (1992) 12 OJLS 
295.
15 See F Leverick, “Is English self-defence law incompatible with article 2 of the ECHR?” [2002] Crim 
LR 347; Leverick, Killing in Self-Defence (n 14) ch 10.
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Secondly, it was feared that the use of an overarching concept of “wickedness” to 
accommodate defences within the defi nition of murder threatened to render defences 
potentially limitless. This concern arose because, according to Lord Rodger, “evidence 
relating to provocation is simply one of the factors which the jury should take into 
account in performing their general task of determining the accused’s state of mind at 
the time when he killed his victim”.16 So, Victor Tadros suggested, even if the formal 
criteria for provocation had not been made out, a jury might nonetheless be entitled to 
conclude that evidence of “quasi-provocation” meant that the accused’s state of mind 
could not be described as “wicked”, meaning that he should be acquitted of murder.17 
Michael Christie went further, suggesting tentatively that the Drury redefi nition of 
murder might allow juries “to fi nd an absence of ‘wicked disposition’ on as broad a 
basis as they may be permitted by the judge in a particular case”,18 which could, for 
example, provide a formal basis for a “mercy killer” or the survivor of a suicide pact to 
claim a partial defence.19
A further diffi culty with Drury was that it did not leave the law of provocation in 
an entirely clear state. What Drury clearly established was that, in cases of provoca-
tion by infi delity, it was inappropriate to ask the jury to consider whether there was 
a reasonably proportionate relationship between the provocation and the accused’s 
response, such a comparison being an “impossible balancing act”.20 Instead, the jury 
should be asked to consider whether the accused’s reaction was such as might have 
been expected of the ordinary person.21
Drury did not, however, decide whether the requirement of a “reasonably propor-
tionate relationship” was inappropriate in cases of provocation by violence, but left 
that question open for determination at a later date.22 That requirement logically 
continued to apply – the decisions endorsing it remaining binding on trial judges23 
– but it was not clear whether the Drury court considered that the “ordinary person” 
requirement was also applicable to cases of provocation by violence. On one view, 
particularly as Lord Rodger had found support for that criterion in earlier authorities 
on provocation by violence,24 the “ordinary person” criterion was of general application 
16 Drury v HM Advocate 2001 SLT 1013 at para 17.
17 V Tadros, “The Scots law of murder”, in Law Commission, The Law of Murder: Overseas Comparative 
Studies (2005) 6 (available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/comparative_studies.pdf).
18 Christie (n 2) at 283. Christie does not offer this as his preferred interpretation of the case, but suggests 
that it is “not wholly excluded”.
19 One might go even further and ask why a judge would be entitled to restrict the jury’s discretion on this 
point at all. Could a jury simply be given an untrammelled power to convict of culpable homicide rather 
than murder on the basis that they did not consider the accused to have acted “wickedly”? 
20 At para 10 per Lord Cameron of Lochbroom. Cf Law Reform Commission for Ireland, Consultation 
Paper on Homicide: The Plea of Provocation (LRC CP 27-2003, 2003), where the Commission advocates 
a proportionality test in all cases of provocation, including provocation by infi delity (paras 7.32-7.38).
21 2001 SLT 1013 at para 10 per Lord Cameron of Lochbroom, para 34 per Lord Justice-General Rodger, 
para 20 per Lord Johnston, para 7 per Lord Nimmo Smith, para 14 per Lord Mackay of Drumadoon.
22 At para 35 per Lord Justice-General Rodger.
23 Chalmers (n 2) at 244.
24 Particularly the leading case of HM Advocate v Smith, High Court at Glasgow, 27 February 1952, 
reported on appeal on another point 1952 JC 66. In Drury (para 33) Lord Rodger quoted from Lord 
Cooper’s charge to the jury in that case and went on to say “…in substance Lord Cooper was telling 
the jury that, to be legally relevant, the provocation would have had to be such as to induce an ordinary 
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to all cases of provocation, with proportionality being a possible additional criterion 
in cases of provocation by violence.25 Alternatively, Drury might have been read as 
establishing, at least for the time being, two separate defences of provocation – provo-
cation by infi delity, where an “ordinary person” test was applicable, and provocation 
by violence, where a proportionality test applied26 – an approach which fi nds support 
in the opinion of Lord Cameron of Lochbroom.27 Against that background, it was not 
surprising that provocation by violence should become the subject of a further Full 
Bench decision.
B. GILLON v HM ADVOCATE
That decision is Gillon v HM Advocate.28 Gillon was charged with (inter alia) murder 
and pled provocation. The trial judge directed the jury that they should consider 
whether the accused’s response had been proportionate to the alleged provocation, 
but made no reference to an “ordinary person” criterion. On appeal, it was argued 
that it was inappropriate to apply a proportionality test in cases of provocation by 
violence, and that this requirement should be replaced by the test of the ordinary 
person. Although, as noted above, one interpretation of Drury was that it already 
required an ordinary person test to be applied to all types of provocation, both the 
parties and the court appear to have assumed that this was not the case.
Three main reasons were advanced for the proposed change: fi rst, that it would 
make the law more coherent; secondly, that it was inherently diffi cult to apply a 
proportionality test where the accused had killed in response to ex hypothesi non-fatal 
violence; and, thirdly (the principal argument), that the proposed change would be 
consistent with the Drury analysis.29
The court rejected the fi rst of these reasons, arguing that the “ordinary person” 
test is recognised in respect of provocation by infi delity because a proportionality test 
cannot be applied in such a case,30 whereas it is possible to apply such a test in cases of 
provocation by violence. And, the court argued, the proportionality test is preferable 
because the “ordinary person” or “reasonable man” test has given rise to numerous 
problems in those jurisdictions where it has been adopted, because of the diffi culties 
associated with deciding which of the characteristics of the accused may be attributed 
to the objective comparator.31 For those reasons, it is preferable for the test not to be 
unifi ed across the two types of provocation.
The court’s reference to the diffi culties encountered with the objective comparator 
man to act in the way in which the accused acted. To put the same point in another way, the jury could 
conclude that, in stabbing the deceased, the accused had acted with the wickedness of a murderer if 
they considered that an ordinary man would not have reacted to the provocation in the same way.” See 
also Lord Rodger’s treatment of Hume (at para 31).
25 Gane, Stoddart & Chalmers, Casebook (n 2) para 10.42; Chalmers & Leverick, Criminal Defences (n 12) 
ch 10.
26 Christie (n 2) at 285; T H Jones and M G A Christie, Criminal Law, 3rd edn (2003) paras 9.62-9.63.
27 At para 10.
28 2006 SLT 799. The decision of the court was given by Lord Osborne.
29 At para 20.
30 At para 21.
31 At paras 21, 31-37.
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elsewhere may not be a conclusive reason for rejecting such a test, for three reasons. 
First, it is arguable that the English courts have now satisfactorily resolved the issue.32 
Secondly, the diffi culties the English courts have faced have arisen primarily in cases 
of non-violent provocation,33 and it may be that the same problems would be unlikely 
to arise in Scotland, where provocation (the infi delity exception aside) can only be by 
violence and it is less likely to be necessary to have recourse to the accused’s personal 
characteristics to explain his response to the provocation. Thirdly, it is not clear that 
a proportionality test wholly excludes consideration of the accused’s personal charac-
teristics. Consider, for example, the English case of Uddin,34 where the defendant 
killed the victim after the latter had thrown a pigskin shoe at him. The signifi cance 
of the assault lay in the defendant’s religious beliefs, and it is diffi cult to see how any 
question of proportionality could be sensibly answered without having reference to 
that personal characteristic. Nevertheless, these are undeniably diffi cult questions, 
something which bolsters the Gillon court’s conclusion that it would be highly undesir-
able to redefi ne the scope of provocation without a comprehensive review being fi rst 
carried out.35
The court rejected the second reason for the proposed change (diffi culty of appli-
cation) in short order, observing that it is “a matter of common experience that death 
may be caused by quite modest violence”.36 While the court is clearly right to reject 
this argument, the line of reasoning is unconvincing. A person who intends only 
to engage in “quite modest violence” will lack the mens rea of murder and so will 
have no need of the provocation defence. Instead, the reason this argument should 
be rejected is that, while a proportionality test doubtless makes it diffi cult to run a 
successful plea of provocation, this ought to be the case. Intentional killings should 
not be readily excused, even partially. The fact that Scots law has adopted a relatively 
restrictive approach to the availability of the plea of provocation may well explain 
why its continued existence has proved far less controversial in this jurisdiction than 
elsewhere.37
C. WHAT IT MEANS TO BE WICKED
“There’s glory for you!”
“I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory’,” Alice said.
“I meant, ‘there’s a nice knock-down argument for you!’”
“But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock-down argument’,” Alice objected.
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone,
“it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.”
– Lewis Carroll, Through The Looking Glass
32 In Attorney-General for Jersey v Holley [2005] UKPC 23, and see R v James [2006] EWCA Crim 14.
33 See the leading cases of R v Morhall [1996] AC 90 (criticism of accused’s glue-sniffi ng habit); Luc Thiet 
Thuan v The Queen [1997] AC 131 (taunting); R v Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146 (allegation of theft); 
Attorney-General for Jersey v Holley [2005] UKPC 23 (derogatory comments).
34 The Times, 14 September 1929, discussed by A J Ashworth, “The doctrine of provocation” [1976] CLJ 
292 at 300.
35 At para 38.
36 At para 22.
37 Chalmers & Leverick, Criminal Defences (n 12) para 10.01.
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In rejecting the third reason for the proposed change (consistency with Drury), 
the Gillon court did not quibble with the Drury analysis of murder. Instead, the court 
opined that “[w]hile the Lord Justice General’s analysis undoubtedly involved a depar-
ture from the more traditional formulations of the nature of provocation, we have no 
reason to disagree with his approach to the underlying mens rea involved in murder 
and culpable homicide, as it relates to a plea of provocation”.38
This is all very well, but the diffi culty is that the Gillon court’s analysis thereafter 
is barely reconcilable with the Drury analysis. The Gillon court concludes that, as a 
matter of policy, the law requires to develop criteria which must be satisfi ed before 
a plea of provocation can succeed, and that policy considerations dictate that the 
“ordinary person” test is undesirable. On the one hand, this policy-based approach 
is attractive, because it provides an answer to the concerns about the Drury analysis 
which were noted earlier. If policy-based restrictions can be placed on the availability 
of defences, then that seems to rule out acquittals on the basis of “quasi-provocation” 
evidencing a lack of mens rea, or acquittals on the basis of a “lack of wicked disposi-
tion” – despite the absence of any recognised defence – more generally. Furthermore, 
this implies that where a plea such as self-defence is founded on a mistake of fact, the 
courts may legitimately impose a criterion of reasonableness before that mistake can 
result in an acquittal.
On the other hand, the policy-based approach makes a mockery of the Drury 
analysis. In that case, Lord Rodger made it quite clear that the inclusion of “wicked” 
in the mens rea of murder was a reference to the accused’s motive:39
Saying that the perpetrator “wickedly” intends to kill is just a shorthand way of referring 
to what Hume (i, 254) describes as the murderer’s “wicked and mischievous purpose”, in 
contradistinction to “those motives of necessity, duty, or allowable infi rmity, which may serve 
to justify or excuse” the deliberate taking of life.
In unacknowledged contradiction to this, the Gillon court has rendered the term 
“wicked” technical and awkward: an accused who intends to kill will be regarded as 
“wicked” unless he satisfi es the criteria for a recognised defence to murder. On this 
basis, for example, the accused who intends to kill in the mistaken belief that his life is 
in danger is “wicked” if his mistake is unreasonable, but is not “wicked” if it is reason-
able. Humpty Dumpty would doubtless have approved of this manner of using words, 
but Alice would have rightly objected (and might have been rather confused by it if 
she had been serving as a juror).
D. CONCLUSION
For all the criticisms made in this note, there is much to applaud about Gillon. It heads 
off many of the potential problems created by the Drury analysis, and leaves Scots law 
with a clearer and more coherent account of the law of provocation than was previ-
ously the case. The law of murder, and of criminal defences, will operate much more 
sensibly as a result of Gillon, but the decision papers over the cracks left by Drury 
rather than getting to the heart of the problems which it created.
38 2006 SLT 799 at para 24.
39 Drury v HM Advocate 2001 SLT 1013 at para 11.
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It would have been far better if the court had simply accepted that the much-criti-
cised Drury analysis of murder was wrong, and unnecessary.40 The court in Drury, 
it is submitted here, was seduced into drawing an unnecessary parallel between one 
form of the mens rea of murder – “wicked recklessness” – and intention. Wickedness 
in wicked recklessness is not, however, a shorthand way of referring to the accused’s 
motivation. Instead, it is a recognition of the very high degree of recklessness which 
is required before the law will consider the accused’s culpability as severe enough to 
be treated as equivalent to an intention to kill.41 Because culpable homicide requires 
the accused to be aware of the risk which he is running42 – “reckless” in the proper 
sense of the term – “wicked” is, in this context, used to distinguish those reckless 
killings which should be treated as murderous from those which are instead culpable 
homicide. Moving backwards to the pre-Drury defi nition of murder would have been 
quite a step forwards for the coherence of Scots criminal law, but it was one that the 
court in Gillon chose not to take.
James Chalmers
University of Edinburgh
Fiona Leverick
University of Aberdeen
40 It is disappointing that no reference was made in Gillon to the extensive academic criticism of this 
analysis.
41 G H Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland, 3rd edn, by M G A Christie (2001) vol 2 para 23.19; Gordon 
(n 2) at 619. Cf Scott v HM Advocate 1996 JC 1 at 5 per Lord Justice-Clerk Ross.
42 Transco Plc v HM Advocate 2004 JC 29.
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